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SUBURBAN APARTMENT ZONING: LEGALITY
AND TECHNIQUE
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent decision of In re Girs11,1 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that a township zoning ordinance which failed to
provide for apartments was unconstitutional. Although not explicitly
prohibited by the ordinance, apartments were not a permitted use in
any of the zoning use districts, and, on petition, the township had
refused to amend the ordinance. The court noted that although permis-
sion to build apartments could be granted by the zoning board of
appeals upon special request for a variance of the zoning ordinance,
such a variance would be allowed only on narrow grounds.' By refusing
to allow apartment development as part of the zoing scheme, the town-
ship was, in effect, zoning out everyone who could live in the township
if apartments were available. In striking down the ordinance, the court
emphasized the intent to exclude apartment dwellers. The decision
departed from prior case law by stressing the motive and effect of the
ordinance, rather than attempting to discern whether the ordinance was
a proper exercise of the police power. The purpose of the ordinance—
the exclusion of apartment dwellers—was unconstitutional. Therefore,
the argument that this exclusionary zoning technique protected the
character of the municipality was not recognized by the court to be
sufficient justification for the zoning ordinance.'
The rationale of the Girsh decision contrasts sharply with the lan-
guage in the case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,' in which
the Supreme Court of the United States, for the first time, upheld the
exercise of the police power by a local government in the area of zoning.
In that case, the Court held that the segregation of residential, business
and industrial land uses by zoning would promote the general welfare:
With particular reference to apartment houses, it is pointed
out that the development of detached house sections is greatly
retarded by the coming of apartment houses which has some-
times resulted in destroying the entire section for private
house purposes; that in such sections very often the apart-
ment house is a mere parasite, constructed in order to take
advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings
created by the residential character of the districts
Fears similar to those expressed by Justice Sutherland in Euclid con-
tinue to find expression in local suburban zoning ordinances. As a
result, many suburban towns are "underzoned" for multi-family units,
1 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
2 Id. at 240-41, 263 A.2d at 396-97.
a Id. at 242, 263 A.2d at 398.
4 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
5 Id. at 394.
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that is, they either have no permitted use for apartments in their
ordinance or they zone a very small percentage of the available land
for multi-family units.
The decision of the Pennsylvania court in Girsh raises serious
questions concerning the continuing validity of exclusionary zoning
ordinances and implies that courts should, and will, look beyond the
boundary lines of the particular municipality in evaluating the effect
of a zoning ordinance. This decision also indicates that the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may be applied to
zoning ordinances.
It is the purpose of this icomment, therefore, to examine the
historical and legal development of zoning as a technique to control
land use, the constitutional limits imposed on zoning by the courts,
the various zoning methods employed by municipalities to provide for
multi-unit dwellings, the treatment of these techniques by the courts
and their adaptability for present and future use in a suburban setting.
H. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF ZONING
A. Pre-Euclid
In the early 1900's, the laissez-faire legislative attitude toward
business was reflected in the courts in cases involving zoning ordi-
nances. Any ordinance that interfered with the use of private property
was considered outside the police power of the state and, therefore,
invalid, provided that the use of the property did not "produce injurious
consequences, or infringe the lawful rights of others." The police
power, which derived from the necessity for effective state and local
government, and not from a specific constitutional provision,7
 was
limited to regulating only those uses of land or buildings which were
found to be detrimental to the public health, safety, morals or material
welfare.8 If the police power exceeded this limit, the ordinance was
struck down as a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' What was detrimental to the public welfare depended
upon the particular court's view of the necessity for, or desirability of,
planning by the local community for its physical growth. Some courts,
for example, held that zoning ordinances restricting businesses to
specified districts were enacted solely in furtherance of aesthetic con-
siderations and, therefore, did not fall within the exercise of the police
power;" other courts found that zoning restrictions secured the public
8 State ex rd. Lachtman v. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226, 237, 158 N.W. 1017, 1021
(1916); See also Willson v. Cooke, 54 Colo. 320, 328, 130 P. 828, 831 (1913).
7 State ex rel. Penrose Investment Co. v. McKelvey, 301 Mo. 1, 16, 256 S.W. 474,
476 (1923).
8 Id. at 20-21, 256 S.W. at 477.
9 Calvo v. City of New Orleans, 136 La. 480, 67 So. 338 (1915) ; People ex rel.
Friend v. City of Chicago, 261 III. 16, 103 N.E. 609 (1913).
10 136 La. at 482, 67 So. at 339; 261 Ill. at 21, 103 N.E. at 612.
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welfare, with any aesthetic benefit being merely incidental, and, there-
fore, upheld the ordinance."
As more zoning ordinances were adopted by local governments,
courts faced with this fait accompli were reluctant to invalidate the
ordinances since they appeared to be successful and were gaining public
support." Indicative of the trend away from the early laissez-faire
attitude, was a decision in 1925 by one state court which had before it
a challenge to a city ordinance that prohibited the erection of multi-
unit dwellings. The court noted that the expanding concept of general
welfare now included economic welfare, public convenience and gen-
eral prosperity, and concluded that the police power must also be
expanded to meet this evolving notion 'of public welfare." In upholding
the city ordinance, the court construed the police power, as expressed
in zoning regulations, as a constructive and affirmative force in pro-
moting the general welfare, and not merely as a negative power to
suppress offensive or harmful uses of property."
Another state court in 1925" stated that
[t]he orderly and advantageous development of the City .. .
and the welfare of its citizens would be promoted by a funda-
mental division of the city into districts devoted respectively
to business and residential purposes . . . .16
This same court went on to justify the exclusion of apartments from
residential districts by stating that they might'overtax the sewage and
water systems, increase traffic hazards, create a greater possibility of
fire and epidemics, and thereby impair the advantage and value of
private residents.'' This case presents a typical example of the problem
faced by the courts in determining what is public welfare and what is
private advantage. In other words, it is unclear whether the court was
concerned with the effect of apartments on the public health, safety
11 Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 638, 149 N.E. 30, 35 (1925).
12 Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 485, 234 P. 381, 384 (1925). The
court stated:
There can be no question but that there is a prevailing and preponderating
sentiment in favor of necessary and reasonable zoning. The growth of this senti-
ment has been rapid and widespread. The first comprehensive zoning ordinance
was that of New York City enacted in 1916. According to a recent bulletin of
the United States Department of Commerce, 35 states and the District of
Columbia have adopted this form of regulation; 221 municipalities have been
zoned and over 22,000,000 inhabitants, aggregating 40 per cent of the urban
population of this country, are living in zoned territory. The rapidity of the
growth of the sentiment in favor of comprehensive zoning, coupled with the
extensive and successful application of the idea, are evidence of its present and
potential value for the promotion and perpetuation, along broader and better
lines, of the moral and material welfare of a people.
18 Id. at 484, 234 P. at 383.
14 Id. at 488, 234 P. at 384.
15 In re Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120 (1925).
16 Id. at 297, 150 N.E. at 122.
I/ Id.
•957
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
and welfare or their effect on the value of private property. Possibly
the court was attempting to show how the public welfare is harmed
by pointing to the impairment in value of private residences. This con-
fusion as to what is indicative of an impairment or promotion of public
welfare continues to present difficulty in zoning litigation."
In Buchanan v. W arley," the Supreme Court of the United States
invalidated racial zoning as an illegitimate exercise of the police power
and as a violation of rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The challenged ordinance made it unlawful for any black person to
move into any residence on a block were the majority of residences
were occupied by white people, and also made it unlawful for a white
person to move into a block occupied by a majority of blacks. 2° An
attempt was made to justify the ordinance as a proper exercise of the
police power because it promoted public peace and racial purity, and
prevented the deterioration of property owned and occupied by
whites.2' The Court held that the ordinance was an invalid exercise
of the police power, noting that the white person's property may be
acquired by an undesirable white neighbor or put to disagreeable,
though lawful, uses and still deteriorate in value." The Court thus
implied that since property value could suffer a decrease in a variety
of ways, to exercise the police power to maintain property value by
excluding certain purchasers from the block would be invalid. The
Court also stated that the ordinance interfered with the rights to
dispose of and purchase property without due process of law in con-
travention of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment and [the] statutes enacted in
furtherance of its purpose operate to qualify and entitle a
colored man to acquire property without state legislation dis-
criminating against him solely because of color."
Until 1926 then, zoning was widespread in urban areas and was up-
held by many state courts; however, it had not been upheld by the
Supreme Court as a valid exercise of the police power.
B. Euclid: The Police Power
In 1926, in Euclid v. Ambler Reality Co.,24 the Supreme Court,
for the first time, upheld a zoning ordinance as a valid exercise of the
18 National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 Aid
597 (1965). The court stated that the private desires of many residents to keep the area
unchanged did not rise to the level of public welfare, and that the zoning power may
not be used to avoid the increased expenses of natural growth. It did say that the zoning
power may be used to regulate the providing of municipal services.
to 245 U.S. 60 (1917) .
20 Id. at 70-71.
21 Id. at 73-74.
22 Id. at 82.
23 Id. at 79.
24 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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police power. The case involved a zoning ordinance in the Village of
Euclid, Ohio, which restricted the use of land, the minimum size of
lots, and the height of buildings in certain designated zones or districts.
This method of controlling land use by establishing designated districts
with specified boundaries and regulating the use and minimum size of
the lots within these boundaries is commonly referred to as "Euclidean
Zoning."25
 Since the primary objective of zoning prior to Euclid was
to protect certain uses from interference by other discordant uses, cer-
tain land uses were excluded from residential districts (considered the
"highest" districts) which were not excluded from commercial dis-
tricts (considered a "lower" district), while other uses were excluded
from commercial districts yet were not excluded from industrial dis-
tricts. Consequently, the lowest use district allowed all authorized
uses. The Supreme Court indicated in Euclid that these restrictions
were upheld because if the discordant uses were not excluded, injury
to the public would occur, 2° and the convenience resulting from the
prevention of this mixture of uses was in the general public interest."
Two years later, the Supreme Court, in its latest decision" involving
the constitutionality of zoning, held that the zoning of one person's
land for residential use by a municipality, when the adjoining lands
were used for industrial and railroad purposes, and the locus was of
comparatively little value for residential purposes, constituted a viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, since the restriction imposed did
not bear a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals
or general welfare."
The legal effect of the two Supreme Court cases was that zoning
became a valid exercise of the police power provided it had a sub-
stantial relationship to the public welfare. Whether an ordinance has
a sufficient relationship to the general welfare is the test that has
become entitled "substantive due process."" Due process includes a
requirement that any ordinance regulating or controlling private prop-
erty must have as its objective the general welfare, since the police
power can be exercised only in furtherance of this public purpose.
Since 1928, the highest court in each state has applied and interpreted
this doctrine for their local communities without further guidance
from the Supreme Court.
Although zoning as a concept has thus gained judicial approval.
the validity of specific zoning ordinances has continually been tested
25 Reno, Non-Euclidean Zoning: The Use of The Floating Zone, 23 Maryland L.
Rev. 105 (1963).
26 272 U.S. at 394-95. The injury that would result would be the general detrimental
effects that apartment buildings would have on single family homes and their residents.
27 Id.
28 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 US. 183 (1928).
20 Id. at 188.
80 See Schwartz, Exclusionary Zoning—Suggested Constitutional Attacks, 4 Clearing-
house Rev. 345 (1970).
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in the state courts. In Simon v. Town of Needham," the constitu-
tionality of a one-acre minimum lot size for a residential district was
upheld as a fair and reasonable restriction. The court considered the
minimum acreage of similar districts in neighboring towns, yet ne-
glected to analyze whether a one-acre lot size was necessary ior public
health or safety. In 1952, the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld a
township ordinance in a rural area requiring a minimum lot size of five
acres for construction of a residence." Without distinguishing among
or relying upon any particular grounds, the court stated that the
ordinance was justified on grounds of preserving the character of the
community, maintaining the value of the property therein, and devot-
ing the land to its most appropriate use. The court stated, in addition,
that the owner contesting the application of the ordinance must show
an abuse of discretion by the zoning authority resulting in an unreason-
able exercise of the zoning power before the court would declare the
ordinance invalid." It appears, therefore, that the court granted to the
ordinance a presumption of validity, yet failed to say what would be
necessary to rebut the presumption, that is, what an unreasonable
exercise of zoning power might be.
In contrast to the holding in the New Jersey case, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has stated that "[a]t some point along the
spectrum . . . the size of lots ceases to be a concern requiring public
regulation and becomes simply a matter of private preference!'" The
court struck down an ordinance requiring a four-acre minimum for
residential purposes ,86 holding that this minimum lot size was not a
reasonable method of preserving open spaces, since alternative methods
for that purpose were available, and that a zoning ordinance may not
be used to avoid increasing responsibilities and economic burdens."
Thus, case law indicates that zoning is a planning instrument which
can be used to control population density, and insure that municipal
services are supplied in a rational manner, but that zoning which is
designed to be exclusionary does not foster or promote the general
welfare and is, therefore, unconstitutional."
In addition to restrictions on lot size, zoning ordinances often
restrict the size of buildings as well. A requirement of 1,300 square
feet of usable floor space, in view of undisputed evidence that a house
containing 980 square feet of usable floor space could meet require-
ments of public safety, health and welfare, was struck down as un-
reasonable in a Michigan case." A 1,800 square foot minimum habit-
81 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942).
82 Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952).
83 Id. at 206, 93 A.2d at 384.
34 National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 507, 524, 215
A.2d 597, 608 (1965).
85 Id. at 533, 215 A.2d at 613.
'	 86 Id. at 529, 215 A.2d at 610.
87 Id. at 523-33, 215 Aid at 607-13.
38 Senefsky v. City of Huntington Woods, 307 Mich. 728, 738-39, 12 N.W.2d 387,
389 (1943).
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able floor space requirement was declared unconstitutional in a
Pennsylvania case wherein the court stated that neither aesthetic
reasons nor conservation of property values, singly or combined, pro-
vides a sufficient basis for a valid ordinance. Nevertheless, a court in
New Jersey, in Lionshead Lake Inc. v. Township of Wayne," seemed
very concerned with the effect the size of dwellings would have upon
the character of the community. It upheld a minimum living floor
space requirement of 768 square feet for a one-story building, and a
1,000 or 1,200 square foot minimum for a two-story building, despite
the fact that the two-story minimum was less than twice the minimum
for a one-story building." If living floor space is substantially related
to the public welfare by virtue of the fact that a certain minimum is
necessary for the health and safety of the persons using the dwelling,
it seems incongruous to vary that minimum according to the number
of stories rather than the number of people or families. Where the
courts draw the line to limit minimum lot size and floor space require-
ments seems to be that point at which no relationship to the general
public welfare can be found rather than where no substantial relation-
ship can be found. In other words, a zoning ordinance which serves
one or possibly two public purposes, but which at the same time tends
to enforce racial, social and status attitudes will be upheld by a court
using the substantive due process test because there is a sufficient
nexus with the public welfare. The private values and objectives which
are given effect by a zoning ordinance are neglected in this analysis.
In zoning litigation, which indirectly involves fundamental prop-
erty rights, it is submitted that a substantial relationship between
public welfare and the zoning restriction should be required, and only
that which is necessary for the public good should be allowed to be
promoted by a local ordinance. But being overly concerned with finding
a sufficient relationship with public welfare in terms of health, safety
and convenience can have a confining effect upon the courts' view.
The inquiry should be broadened. The effect a minimum Iot or build-
ing size has on land value, and consequently on who purchases the
land and what is built on the land, generally has been disregarded by
the courts. High minimums tend to inflate land values and increase the
cost of construction, thereby resulting in economic exclusion. Multi-
family dwellings built in a town with inflated land values because of
an exclusionary ordinance cannot be rented to low or moderate income
families because of the high developmental costs. Towns with inflated
land values usually have stringent requirements in their ordinances
for landscaping, parking, light and noise abatement and setback. These
additional restrictions also increase building and maintenance costs.
It appears then, that what is needed, in addition to requiring that
a substantial relationship exist between the ordinance and the general
80 In re Medinger, 377 Pa. 217, 226, 104 Aid 118, 122 (1954).
4° 10 N.J. 165, 174, 89 A.2d 693, 697 (1952),
41 Id. at 174, 89 A.2d at 698.
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welfare, and that the objective of the ordinance be necessary for the
public welfare, is a redefining of the public welfare to include all
people affected by the ordinance, either by inclusion or exclusion. The
traditional approach under the police power rationale has been to
define the general public welfare as the welfare of the community
whose zoning ordinance is being tested. If the general public welfare
concept is expanded to include those excluded by zoning ordinances,
the rationale of maintaining the character of the community and en-
hancing property values within the community as support for zoning
ordinances would no longer have validity. This rationale for main-
taining the status quo would become under-inclusive, that is, it would
not encompass everyone affected by the ordinance.
In addition to satisfying the public welfare requirement, zoning
also must be accomplished in accordance with a comprehensive plan.
This standard is imposed upon local communities by zoning enabling
statutes enacted by the state legislature. The Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act" requirement that zoning "regulations shall be made in
accordance with a comprehensive plan"" is found in all state enabling
acts although the requirement is not interpreted uniformly by each
state."
When a village in New York passed a zoning ordinance that did
not allow any use "by right" in a planned residential district, but
authorized use by issuing special permits, the court invalidated the
ordinance as a device to permit lot-by-lot zoning rather than zoning
in accordance with a comprehensive plan." A comprehensive plan re-
quires that rezoning be accomplished in consonance with the funda-
mental land use policies and development plans of a community." A
comprehensive plan is similar to a land use plan which has been defined
as
simply a basic scheme generally outlining planning and zon-
ing objectives in an extensive area. It is in no sense a final
plan and is continually subject to modification in light of
actual land use development. It serves as a guide rather than
a straightjacket.'
The land use plan in most communities is incorporated into the specific
sections of the zoning ordinance itself. Thus, the requirement that a
zoning change be in accordance with a comprehensive plan means
42 Reprinted in 3 A. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning 100-1 et seq.
(3d ed. 1962).
43 Id. at 100-1 Sec. 3.
44 See Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1154
(1955), for a full discussion of the various interpretations of this requirement.
43 Marshall v. Village of Wappingers Falls, 28 App. Div.2d 542, 279 N.Y.S.2d 654,
656 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
43 Mazzara v. Town of Pittsford, 34 App. Div.2d 90, 93, 310 N.Y.S.2d 865, 867
(Sup. Ct. 1970).
47 Ward v. Knippenberg, 416 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Ky. 1967).
962
SUBURBAN APARTMENT ZONING
that the change must be a reasonable extension of the land use plan
reflected in the ordinance." A more liberal interpretation of this re-
quirement is that the zoning change merely be considered carefully
by the legislative body with respect to the community at large."
The application of the standard that zoning must be in accordance
with a comprehensive plan becomes particularly crucial when a small
tract of land is rezoned by an amendment to the zoning ordinance. This
is generally referred to as "spot zoning" and may be valid or invalid.
When spot zoning is done in contradiction to or in disregard of the
comprehensive plan, it is held invalid. Invalid spot zoning has been
defined as
[the] process of singling out a small parcel of land for a use
classification totally different from that of the surrounding
area, for the benefit of the owner of such property and to the
detriment of other owners.. .."
If, however, the rezoning of a small parcel of land creates a different
use within a larger district zoned otherwise, it may be a valid amend-
ment if enacted in accordance with the comprehensive plan." The
size of the rezoned parcel alone, although not solely determinative in
a court finding of invalid spot zoning, may be solely determinative in
a court finding of valid spot zoning.52 That is, if a large parcel is re-
zoned for a use discordant with the surrounding use, it is more likely
that the rezoning was done with the interests of the community in
mind and with the purpose of affecting a large segment of the com-
munity and, consequently, a presumption arises that the rezoning was
done in accordance with the comprehensive plan. The rezoning of a
small parcel, however, since it is more susceptible to attack on the
grounds that it was done for a particular property owner, must be
shown to have been done in accordance with the comprehensive plan
in order to be valid.
An example of the court's reaction to the spot zoning problem is
found in an Illinois case" in which a municipality attempted to amend
a zoning ordinance, in order to maintain a block as a residential area,
by changing the zone from multi-family to two family use. The court
held the change invalid since there were already eight apartments on
the block, and the adjoining block had been zoned for multi-family
use. The comprehensive plan for this section of the village, as evidenced
by the existing uses which were permitted on the block and by the
zoning of the adjoining block, indicated that this amendment was in
Reno, supra note 25, at 112.
43 Id.
ao Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 123, 96 N.E.2d 731, 734 (1951).
51 Id. at 124, 96 N.E.2d at 735.
82 Thomas v. Town of Bedford, 11 N.Y.2d 428, 435, 184 N.E.2d 285, 288, 230
N.Y.S.2d 684, 689 (1962).
53 Lancaster Dev.
P
 Ltd. v. Village of River Forest, 84 Ill. App.2d 395, 401, 228
N.E.2d 526, 529 ( 1967).
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contradiction of the plan and was, therefore, invalid. In a recent New
York case,54
 where the local legislature's sole consideration for rezoning
the locus from single to multi-family use was found to be the benefit
of the petitioner, who planned to contruct a multi-family facility on
the locus, the court found this rezoning to be prohibited spot zoning.
The court stated that the requirement that zoning changes be in accor-
dance with a comprehensive plan was legislative recognition that piece-
meal and haphazard zoning did not satisfy the need for promoting the
general welfare.55
 This desire to prevent indiscriminate piecemeal zon-
ing is based upon the premise that the inhabitants of zoning districts
rely upon a degree of stability in use classification and should not be
subject to rapid or unsuspected zoning changes.
Some courts have held that the location of, and the limitations
placed upon, newly created or changed zoning districts are indicative
of a change made in accordance with the comprehensive plan." The
detailed planning and regulations in the new enactment, and the selec-
tion of a site well suited for the new use, are evidence that before the
change was passed considerable study had taken place. For those
courts which have adopted a liberal view of the comprehensive plan
requirement, the pre-enactment analysis satisfies that requirement,
whereas other courts would require more indicia that the new zoning
districts are in accordance with the comprehensive plan.
When a legislative body on its own initiative seeks to amend a
zoning ordinance, the courts limit the power of amendment to cases
where either the original zoning classification can be shown to be un-
reasonable or arbitrary, or the conditions and character of the neigh-
borhood have changed sufficiently to make the original classification
unreasonable." For example, when the legislative body of Kansas City
rezoned a tract from single family duplex residence to multi-story
apartment or hotel use, the court upheld the change because it was
"in accordance with the growth and changing conditions in the area
involved and encouraged the most appropriate use of the land.”"
Changed conditions give jurisdiction for the legislative action and
prevent zoning amendments from being purely arbitrary or capricious,
thereby protecting the inhabitants from uncontrollable power in the
hands of the local legislature.
Once the authority has itself encroached upon its own comprehen-
sive plan by allowing deviations, and an owner seeks a rezoning for a
use compatible with the use already permitted, the authority cannot
54 Mazzara v. Town of Pittsford, 34 App. Div.2d 90, 310 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Sup. Ct.
1970).
55 Id. at 92, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
56 Hermann v. Village of East Hills, 104 N.Y.S.2d 592 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 279 App.
Div. 753, 109 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1951); See also Thomas v. Town of Bedford, 11 N.Y.2d
428, 434, 184 N.E.2d 285, 288, 230 N.Y.S.2d 684, 688 (1962).
57 Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 Md. 136, 96 A.2d 27 (1953); Andrew C. Petersen, Inc.
v. Town Plan. & Zoning Comm'n, 154 Conn. 638, 228 A.2d 126 (1967).
55 Standberg v. Kansas City, 415 S.W.2d 737, 747 (Mo. 1967).
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deny the request for rezoning. 59 This is a type of "constructive"
rezoning which takes place when the authority allows deviations from
its own comprehensive plan, thereby creating the changed conditions
necessary for a rezoning.
It is important to note that local legislatures are allowed to con-
sider changed conditions outside of their jurisdictional limits as a
basis for rezoning within their zoning districts.° Since changed condi-
tions in a neighboring community can be the basis for a zoning change,
the courts in upholding this principle are, in effect, recognizing that
the public welfare for a municipality may be defined in terms of con-
ditions outside its boundary lines due to an interaction between neigh-
boring communities. If a town may consider outside factors that have
a discernible bearing on the town's general welfare, it can be argued,
conversely, that the courts should not allow towns to ignore the effect
of their ordinances on other communities. Once factors outside the
community are required to be considered in enacting an ordinance,
the invocation of a local comprehensive plan as an obstruction to a
requested change or amendment would not be allowed"' since this plan
would no longer be co-extensive with the general welfare and, there-
fore, would not be a valid test for the legitimate use of the police power.
Unfortunately, the courts in using the police power approach
have limited their inquiry to the general welfare as defined in terms of
the local community. The comprehensive plan requirement is used as
a test to determine if a zoning change reflects some relationship to the
general welfare of the local community, rather than the general public
welfare of that area affected by the zoning ordinance within and
without the boundaries of the local community. It is in this respect
that the use of the police power rationale and test to challenge zoning
ordinances is subject to severe limitation.
C. Beyond Euclid: Equal Protection
While it is important to evaluate the techniques of zoning to
ensure that they are not used in a manner inconsistent with the police
power, it is also important to evaluate them in terms of equal protection
of the law to ensure that techniques which, when disguised as principles
of zoning, tend to assume an aura of validity, do not in fact result in
a deprivation of opportunity in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.92
 Since modern zoning ordinances maintain and enhance prop-
erty value by requiring minimum lot sizes, minimum floor space require-
ments, and a minimum of discordant uses within a municipality, they
effectively exclude certain purchasers from the community because of
insufficient income. Essentially, the lack of opportunity to live in the
suburbs is due to the lack of low and moderate-income housing, in-
th Metropolitan Dade Co. v. Pierce, 236 Sold 202, 204 (Fla. 1970).
80 Central Ky. Dev. Co. v. Bryan, 416 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Ky. 1967).
01 R. Babcock, The Zoning Game 134 (1969).
62 Id. at 136-37.
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cluding both single unit dwellings and apartments. Those apartments
that are built in the suburbs cannot be rented to low-income groups
without rent subsidies because the zoning ordinance requirements drive
units costs up and force higher maintenance and auxiliary costs. This
economic segregation" may result in de facto racial segregation if a
sufficient correlation can be established between low-income groups
unable to "buy into" the community and racial minorities." Whether
this lack of opportunity resulting from the exclusionary effect of the
zoning ordinance is a violation of the equal protection clause can be
analyzed in four different ways.
1. Equal Application of the Law
The equal protection clause is an expression that the law itself
must reach an equitable result. 65 The issue thus presented is whether
persons similarly situated receive equal treatment under a particular
law." Although suburban zoning ordinances presumably treat those
persons within the community who are landowners with a reasonable
amount of uniformity, it can be argued that this classification of people
is under-inclusive; that is, the ordinance affects more people than the
local landowners, namely, those seeking to buy or rent in the com-
munity. It affects all those seeking entrance to the community and
discriminates against those of low and moderate income by erecting
economic barriers to their entrance.
Moreover, the effect of local zoning restrictions can have regional
or metropolitan ramifications. Suburban towns have a virtual monopoly
on vacant land 87 They may restrict or prohibit the development of
land within their boundaries by the use of zoning restrictions. These
restrictions lead to inflated land values within the community and this
inflation does not stop at the town boundary. Neighboring towns are
induced to impose similar restrictions. If they do not establish the
same general restrictions, disparities in land values will become evident
and developers will be encouraged to buy in and develop the land in
those towns with less stringent restrictions. Consequently, towns that
have fewer restrictions, smaller lot sizes and more flexible zoning
techniques eventually provide an inequitable share of metropolitan
housing and associated services. When suburban towns act in concert
in restricting land development, the effect is to increase the density of
urban population, especially among lower income groups." Because
of these extraterritorial effects of local zoning, the local general welfare
03 See Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the
Indigent, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 767 (1969) ; See also Snob Zoning—A Look at the Economic
and Social Impact of Low Density Zoning, 15 Syracuse L. Rev. 507 (1964).
84 Schwartz, supra note 30, at 362.
08 Tusaman and ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L, Rev. 341,
342 (1949).
60 Id. at 344.
07 Note, The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79 Yale L.J. 896, 908 (1970)
88 Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 Yale L.J. 1418, 1427 (1969).
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criterion, which traditionally has been applied to test the validity of
a zoning ordinance, is no longer valid. In Girsh," the court, in effect,
found that local criteria was unreasonable. It held that protecting
the character of the municipality was not a sufficient justification for
an exclusionary zoning technique." The court also recognized the
regional implications of local zoning when it stated:
Perhaps in an ideal world, planning and zoning would be done
on a regional basis. . .. But as long as we allow zoning to be
done community by community, it is intolerable to allow
one municipality (or many municipalities) to close its doors
at the expense of surrounding communities and the central
cities .11
Local zoning ordinances, if exclusionary, may result in unequal treat-
ment for those persons excluded because the criteria of municipal
general welfare and a comprehensive plan are not valid indicators of
a welfare that is truly general."
2. Equal Protection and Discriminatory Legislation
The equal protection clause also prohibits discriminatory legisla-
tion." The imposition of burdens or the granting of benefits must
always be justified on the grounds that they are necessary either to
eliminate some social evil or to achieve some public good." When the
motives behind the legislation do not comport with these public pur-
poses, then the legislation becomes discriminatory and invalid." Mo-
tives, however, are very difficult to evaluate and substantiate. Never-
theless, a recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, Dailey v. City of Lawton," upheld the findings of the district
court that the Planning Commission and City Council were racially
motivated and sought to exclude blacks and other minorities from the
area by denying an application for a zoning change to permit the con-
struction of a low-cost housing project." Although there was no direct
proof of motive, the court inferred the motive to discriminate from
the following factors: (1) the area involved was predominantly white;
(2) the proposed housing project was designed for low-income groups;
and (3) the signers of the petition opposing the proposed zoning change
were all white. In holding that an inference of motive was proper, the
court stated that "[i]f proof of a civil right violation depends on an
open statement by an official of an intent to discriminate the Four-
69 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
70 Id. at 244, 263 A.2d at 398.
71 Id. at 245, 263 A.2d at 399.
72 R. Babcock, supra note 61, at 148.
73 Tussman and ten Brock, supra note 65, at 342.
74 Id. at 358.
75 Id. at 359.
76 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
77 Id. at 1039.
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teenth Amendment offers little solace to those seeking its protection.""
Motive may be distinguished form legislative intent in that the motive
refers to the subjective state of mind of legislators while enacting an
ordinance or denying a permit, whereas intent refers to the objective
purposes of the ordinance or by-law. An equal protection violation
results from a discriminatory motive, even though the intent may be
non-discriminatory. For example, large minimum lot sizes indicate an
intent to enhance property values. If this intent is motivated by a
desire to ensure a return from an investment in real estate, the motive
woud be non-discriminatory, whereas if it were motivated by a desire
to exclude buyers on racial or economic grounds, the motive would be
discriminatory.
Since motives are usually confined to the individual legislator's
thinking, it is more difficult to show discriminatory motive when
challenging the validity of a minimum lot size than it is when challeng-
ing the denial of a zoning change or amendment. Before a petition for
a zoning change can be denied, there must be a public hearing at which
all interested persons can be heard, and the deciding body must state
its reasons for denial. This procedure creates the necessary confronta-
tion that brings legislative motive into the public view, whereas the
enactment of a restrictive or exclusionary zoning ordinance is a more
passive legislative action subject to less public scrutiny. This makes it
difficult to single out discriminatory motives. If, however, the reasons
given in support of the exclusionary ordinance can be shown to be
neither a legitimate exercise of the police power nor the true rationale
behind the ordinance, then it might be possible to uncover a discrimina-
tory motive. For example, when a community argues that the increased
cost of municipal services justifies a particular zoning restriction it
begs the question; it assumes that local communities possess the power
to exclude in order to curb municipal spending. This rationale was
recently invalidated in In re Kit -Mar Builders Inc.," where the court
struck down two and three-acre minimum lot requirements by uncover-
ing their exclusionary purpose. The court said it would not allow the
township to keep people out rather than make community improve-
ments.' The court implicitly recognized the equal protection argument
by stating:
[while] this problem in general, is postured as involving the
constitutional due process rights of the land-owner whose
property has been zoned adversely to his best interests, it
cannot realistically be detached from the rights of other people
desirous of moving into the area "in search of a comfortable
place to live.""
78 Id.
79 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
80 Id. at 472, 268 A.2d at 768.
81 Id.
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From the preceding cases it is apparent that the exclusionary
motive need not be expressed, but may be inferred from either the
events surrounding the enactment, change or petition for change of an
ordinance, or from the results brought about by the ordinance. As the
housing needs of the low and moderate-income groups increase, it will
become more difficult to justify the imposition of a financial barrier in
the form of exclusionary zoning as promoting the public welfare in the
face of attacks on its discriminatory results.
3. Substantive Equal Protection
Probably the most fruitful use of the equal protection clause in
challenging the validity of exclusionary zoning will be by framing the
issue as one of "substantive equal protection."" The equal protection
clause shares with the due process clause the power to place "substan-
tive limits upon the exercise of the police power." 88 In other words,
certain rights are embodied in the equal protection clause which, al-
though similar to substantive due process rights, may more easily be
defined in the context of equal protection. When one of these rights is
violated by an extension of the police power, the result is a violation of
both equal protection and due process. The police power has exceeded
its limits, thereby violating due process, and has violated equal pro-
tection by infringing upon a substantive right protected by the equal
protection clause."
In Buchanan," a racial zoning ordinance was struck down be-
cause it interfered with the property rights of white sellers and black
purchasers. These rights were guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Court implied that they were guaranteed by the equal pro-
tection clause by interpreting the statutes enacted in furtherance of the
Amendment's purpose as entitling a black man to acquire property
without state legislation discriminating against him." The statute the
Court mentioned was the Civil Rights Act of 1866 87 which was reen-
acted in 1870 subsequent to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The statute provides that "[all! citizens of the United States
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed
by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, sell, hold and convey
real and personal property." 88
 The legislative history of this statute
indicates a desire to implant in the Fourteenth Amendment equal
property rights for all citizens. Further, in Shelley v. Kramer," the
82 Tussman and ten Brock, supra note 65, at 342-43.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 364.
85 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
Be Id. at 79.
87 42 U.S.C. $ 1982 (1964). This statute was originally enacted on April 9, 1866 as
14 Stat. 27, ch. 31, 8 U.S.C. $ 42. It was reenacted in $ 18 of the Act of May 31, 1870
subsequent to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
88 Id.
89 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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Supreme Court made it clear that the right to acquire, own and dispose
of property was among those civil rights that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment wanted to protect from discriminatory state
action." The Shelley Court, in refusing judicial enforcement of a
private racially restrictive covenant, found that a denial of equal
protection would have resulted if the covenant was enforced because
the covenant would have denied Negroes the equal opportunity to
exercise their property rights.°' From this rationale it can be concluded
that an unburdened right to purchase property, free from discrimin-
atory state action, is basic to the equal protection clause. The court in
Girth was not unmindful of these considerations when it said:
This case deals with the right of people to live on land, a very
different problem than whether [a municipality] must allow
certain industrial uses within its borders. Apartment living
is a fact of life that communities . . . must learn to accept."
Since local municipalities derive their zoning authority from state
zoning enabling acts they are, in effect, agents of the state." For a
state agent to burden the right to live on land in such a manner as to
preclude the exercise of this right by low-income groups or racial
minorities is a denial of equal protection; and unless these burdens
imposed by zoning can find justification in the implementation of
public goals of overriding importance,°4
 they should not be allowed to
stand.
4. Right to Travel
It is possible to argue that exclusionary zoning ordinances burden
the fundamental right to travel and are, therefore, subject to the "com-
pelling state interest" test, as set forth in Shapiro v. Thompson.° 5
 In
that case, the Supreme Court recognized the fundamental right to
travel from state to state and held that residency requirements for
welfare recipients would be upheld only if they found their justification
in a "compelling governmental interest" because they burdened that
right to travel." In Edwards v. California," the Supreme Court, bas-
ing its decision on the commerce clause, held that California could not
exclude indigents from the state. Whether this right to travel, as
espoused in Shapiro and Edwards, necessarily implies a right to travel
about one's own state, or whether this right is so basic to state citizen-
ship as to make reliance upon the Shapiro and Edwards rationales
unnecessary, has not yet been decided. There should, at least, be
99 Id. at 20.
91 Id. at 20-21.
92
 437 Pa. at 246, 263 A.2d et 399.
98
 Note, Large Lot Zoning, supra note 68, at 1434.
94
 See Sager, supra note 63, at 784, 794.
95
 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
09
 Id. at 634.
97
 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
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recognition of one's right to move about or settle in a new area in a
state where he resides. If this right to intrastate travel has the same
constitutional safeguards as the right to interstate travel, and if the
state imposes a burden on the exercise of this right, then it should have
to show a "compelling governmental interest" to justify the burden.
The Court in Edwards, recognizing that the problems of the poor
were national problems, held that arbitrary exclusion of indigents as
a class from a state would infringe upon the indigent's right to travel,
and thereby become a denial of equal protection.° 8 One possible fun-
damental distinction between the exclusion in Edwards and the exclu-
sion from suburban communities is that California's exclusion of in-
digents was de jure while the exclusionary zoning ordinance is de facto
in nature. This distinction may not in fact validate an ordinance, how-
ever, since the zoning ordinance operates indirectly to bring about an
exclusion that may be de jure, although appearing to be de facto at
first glance. By not providing any zoning use districts for apartments,
a community is not specifically stipulating that no apartments will be
built, but is, by omission, not allowing any to be built. Indirect means
of accomplishing an effect which could not validly be accomplished
directly should not be allowed if the result is discriminatory exclusion.
The courts have been reluctant to apply the equal protection
analysis to local zoning ordinances. This failure has prevented a proper
examination of the effect of zoning on people other than individual
local landowners. It is submitted that in a new and different perspec-
tive resulting from the application of the equal protection clause, the
equities involved in zoning will shift, and a fuller realization of the
property rights of all persons affected by local zoning will result.
III. METHODS OP ZONING FOR MULTIPLE FAMILY USE
The Massachusetts legislature recently enacted a statute de-
signed to increase the supply and improve the regional distribution of
low and moderate-income housing. This statute applies only to housing
built under state and federal assistance programs and, consequently,
is limited in use to public agencies and non-profit or limited dividend
corporations.100 Under this statute, a developer may obtain one com-
prehensive permit from the local zoning board of appeals which would,
if granted, give him authority to begin construction. This provision is
an attempt to eliminate the morass of administrative delays which
result from the necessity for a developer to procure several different
permits.
The appellate machinery established by this new statute is inter-
esting and unique. The State Department of Community Affairs has
established a committee which can review local zoning decisions with
08 Id. at 173-77.
09
 Mass. Acts and Resolves of 1969, ch. 774 Amending Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 40E
and ch. 23B,
100 See Huber, Land Use Law, 16 Ann. Surv. of Mass. Law 360 (1969).
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a minimum of delay.' This committee has authority to determine
whether a decision against the developer by the local zoning board of
appeals was reasonable and "consistent with local needs." What is
"consistent with local needs" is a standard which requires considera-
tion of local and regional housing needs as well as local general welfare
factors.
Although there are administrative and practical difficulties with
the application of some provisions of this law, 102
 its enactment is a
clear indication from the state legislature that if suburban towns do
not provide adequate zoning provisions for low and moderate-income
housing within their jurisdictions, they may be coerced into doing so
on terms other than their own. It thus behooves local communities to
establish local zoning provisions for this type of housing while they are
still able to use their own discretion in providing adequate safeguards
for planned development.
Other states have taken or contemplate similar action to encour-
age suburban communities to provide multi-family apartments within
their boundaries since the nation's housing needs mandate that action
be taken to increase the rate of construction of this type of housing. 1°3
For example, New York State has recently established the New York
Urban Development Corporation which has the power to override local
zoning ordinances where private enterprise has failed to fill the need
for safe and sanitary housing accomodations for low-income families. 10'
While these developments indicate possible improvement in the
multi-unit housing shortage in the future, the fact remains, as previ-
ously noted, that many municipalities are presently "underzoned" for
multi-family units. In the absence of specific provisions in a local
zoning ordinance permitting the construction of multi-family dwell-
ings, a developer or landowner who wishes to build apartments can
petition either the local legislative body for a zone change by amend-
ment or the zoning board of appeals for a variance to the zoning
ordinance. Petitioning often results in litigation, initiated either by the
petitioner who was turned down by the local board, or by neighbors,
abutters, or other interested parties seeking to maintain the zoning
status quo.
A. The Variance of the Zoning Ordinance
A variance may be obtained by an owner or developer of land who
wishes to build a multi-family complex upon petition to the local
101 Id.
102
 Id. at 362. The local planning commission is probably in a more advantageous
position than the zoning board of appeals to issue a comprehensive permit because it has
the responsibility to develop long-range plans for community zoning and development
and to recommend zoning changes to the local legislature, whereas the board of appeals
has traditionally had authority only to issue variances and exceptions to the zoning
ordinances.
103 See Huber, supra note 100.
104 N.Y. Unconsol. Laws §I 6251-285 (McKinney 1969). See Sherer, Snob Zoning:
Developments in Massachusetts and New Jersey, 7 Harv. J.L. 246 (1970).
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zoning board of appeals. It is a limited device in that the local com-
munity cannot initiate the action and the granting of a variance is
regulated by very stringent standards. In most states, in order to ob-
tain a variance it is necessary to show that (1) the land cannot yield
a reasonable return if used for the purpose specified in the zoning
ordinance or that "special reasons" exist "in particular cases,'" (2)
the plight of the owner is due to unique circumstances and not due to
a general condition of the neighborhood,'" and (3) the use sought will
not alter the essential character of the neighborhood.'"
The requirement of proving undue hardship is very difficult to
meet. The fact that a zoning change would increase the value of a plot
of land does not mean that the owner is suffering undue hardship under
the present zoning use. In Scobie v. Idarola, 1 U 8
 the court held that a
variance was not justified on the grounds that the varied use was the
best use of land or that it would enhance the character of the neighbor-
hood. Hardship must be shown, and since the owner failed to show it,
the variance was invalid.'"
To satisfy the requirement for hardship, the owner is required to
show that the application of the zoning ordinance, as written, would
be "confiscatory or would effectively destroy the economic utility" of
his property.11U When a special reason is required, however, factors
other than that of the economic detriment of the landowner may be
considered. In DeSimone v. Greater Englewood Housing Corp. No.
1, 1 " a recent case decided in New Jersey where the landowner had to
establish a "special reason," the granting of a use variance to a non-
profit housing corporation was upheld on the grounds that the need
for low-income housing constituted a special reason. The court was
explicit in stating that the special reason for the variance had no
relationship to the hardship of the owner. The court stated that
semi-public housing accomodations to provide safe, sanitary
106
 E.g., N.J.S.A. § 40:55-39(d) (1967) provides:
The [zoning] board of adjustment shall have the power to: . • (d) Recom-
mend in particular cases and for special reasons to the governing body of the
municipality the granting of a variance to allow a structure or use [in the
district restricted against such structure or use].
100 In Shacka v. Board of Appeals, 341 Mass. 593, 171 N.E.2d 167 (1961), the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the decision of the Superior Court
which had allowed the issuance of a variance to permit erection of an automobile service
station in a general residence district because "[n]o hardship to the intervener is shown
which is 'owing to conditions especially affecting' his property and 'not affecting generally
the zoning district in which it is located.'" Id. at 594, 171 N.E.2d at 168. The court
went on to state that an amendment to the statute, authorizing variances when "'sub-
stantial hardship financial or otherwise" existed, did not lessen the requirement that the
hardship be due to conditions "'especially affecting such parcel. . " Id.
I" Taxpayer's Ass'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 301 N.Y. 215, 93 N.E.2d 645
(1950).
108
 155 Conn. 22, 229 A.2d 361 (1967).
10D Id.
110 Clapp v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 29 Conn. Supp. 4, 9, 268 A.2d 919, 921 (1970).
111 56 N.J. 428, 267 A.2d 31 (1970).
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and decent housing, to relieve and replace substandard living
conditions or to furnish housing for minority or underprivi-
leged segments of the population outside of ghetto areas is a
special reason. . . .1"
It appears, therefore, that some variance requirements would allow
for consideration of the community's housing needs, whereas others
require a hardship to arise from the locus in question and would there-
by eliminate housing needs as a basis for a variance.
If a landowner is required to show that his hardship results from
circumstances unique to his property, and the incompatibility of the
zoning ordinance and the reasonably profitable use of land extends
over a large area encompassing land not owned by the petitioner, then
the variance will be denied. The rationale behind the denial is that
grounds exist for a rezoning rather than for a variance.
Also, if there exist in the area of the locus several non-conforming
uses similar to the one the petitioner is applying for, then the chances
of the variances being granted are greatly reduced. There is a point
where one additional variance in a neighborhood amounts to a "rezon-
ing" in contradiction to the declared policy in the ordinance."'
Provided undue hardship due to unique circumstances can be
shown, there is a strong possibility that a zoning board of appeals
would find that the erection of a large multi-family complex, especially
if it is low or moderate-income housing, in a single residence zone
would alter the essential character of the neighborhood. 114 Implied in
the requirement that a variance must not result in an altering of the
essential character of the neighborhood is the concept of the protection
of the public welfare. This assumes that the present zoning ordinance
and allowed uses adequately promote the general welfare, and that a
use which would substantially alter the neighborhood would neces-
sarily be injurious to the public welfare and, therefore, invalid. The
fact that many communities are presently using mixed zoning tech-
niques in which light industrial uses are combined with single residence
use would tend to indicate that an alteration of the character of the
neighborhood does not, per se, mean that the public welfare would be
harmed. Variances can be issued with accompanying conditions of
compliance so that the newly authorized uses can be made more com-
patible with the primary use. By stipulating conditions which would
alleviate some of the "harmful" effects of apartments, it would be
possible to combine single use and multi-family use. Although the new
use might alter the essential character, it would not be harmful to the
public welfare. In fact, this technique might promote the public wel-
fare if there is a housing shortage in the area.
112 Id. at 442, 267 A.2d at 38-39.
113 Delaney v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 134 Conn. 240, 245, 56 A.2d 647, 650 (1947).
114 See Grossman, Apartments in Community Planning: A Suburban Area Case
Study, 25 Urban Land 3, 4 (1966). There certainly would be strong local opposition
claiming that it would have this effect.
974
SUBURBAN APARTMENT ZONING
Even if the requirements for the granting of a variance are met,
and the board does in fact grant the variance, the landowner is not
assured of the right to use his property in accordance with the vari-
ance. Since the power to rezone is vested in the legislature, any en-
croachment upon that power will be invalidated. Any variance which,
by itself or jointly with previous variances, creates a serious alteration
in the characteristics of the zoning district will be invalid because the
board of appeals has exceeded its authority in allowing an alteration of
a zoning district. A variance, although properly granted by the board
of appeals, may be attacked on the grounds that it was based upon an
invalid delegation of the legislature's authority, or that inadequate
standards were established to guide the administrative board's decision
making."' The potential vulnerability of a board of appeal's decision
gives rise to costly and time-consuming litigation."' This makes the
variance procedure even more unattractive to one seeking to build
multi-family housing.
The essential nature of a variance makes the granting of one
appear to other landowners in the same district as a favor, thus tending
to alienate them toward the housing to be:erected. This tends to cause
local opposition to organize and resist further attempts to get multi-
family housing in the community."'
B. Amendment of the Zoning Ordinance
An amendment to a zoning ordinance must satisfy the same re-
quirements as the ordinance itself; 118 it must be enacted to promote
the general welfare and be in accordance with the comprehensive plan.
An amendment will be upheld unless there is no substantial relation-
ship between the amendment and the expressed purposes of the ordi-
nances it amends,'" or unless it unreasonably or arbitrarily discrim-
inates rather than furthers the public welfare."' An application for
reclassification of property use " 'must serve the public interest in the
zoning development of the community.'" 121 An amendment, of course,
must be approved and adopted by the local legislative body, which, in
some smaller towns, meets only once or twice a year, and often the
vote required for adoption of an amendment is more than that neces-
sary for original adoption of the zoning ordinance or by-law. 122 Before
an amendment is submitted to the legislature for adoption, a public
115 Smith v. Board of Appeals, 319 Mass. 341, 344-45, 65 N.E.2d 547, 549 (1946).
115 Comment, The Effect of the Housing Shortage on the Single-Family Residential
Zone, 46 Nw. U.L. Rev. 745, 750 (1951).
117 Id.
118 Schertzer v. City of Somerville, 345 Mass. 747, 750, 189 N.E.2d 555, 558 (1963).
11° Id. at 751, 189 N.E.2d at 558.
120 Freeman v. City of Yonkers, 205 Misc. 947, 955, 129 N.Y.S.2d 703, 708 (Sup.
Ct. 1954); Soule v. Town of Perinton, 152 N.Y.S.2d 734, 738 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
121 Suburban Dev. Corp. v. Town Council, 158 Conn. 301, 303, 259 A.2d 634, 636
(1969).
122 See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, § 6, the original adoption, requires a simple
majority, whereas § 7, an amendment, requires a two -thirds majority.
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hearing will be held to provide interested persons an opportunity to
object to or support the amendment. These procedural requirements
are time consuming and cumbersome.
An amendment eliminates some of the objections raised against
variances since legislative adoption dispels the charges of abuse of
discretion and unlawful delegation of authority. Amendments, how-
ever, are often attacked on the grounds that they result in illegal spot
zoning. An amendment can result in the rezoning of a certain area or
the addition of a permitted use in previously zoned districts. When an
area is rezoned the change must be part of a well-considered and com-
prehensive plan."' Many courts have found that a housing shortage
or a population increase in a community is important in showing that
a rezoning for multi-family use is not arbitrary or unreasonable, but
rather is designed to promote the general welfare.'" In DeSena v.
Gulde,12' however, the court limited the use of zoning to accomplish
objectives related to the use of the land. The basis for the amendment
in that case, which changed the use from light manufacturing to single
residence, was a fear of disorder and a resultant economic loss due to
the threat of picketing and demonstrations. The court said: "If safety
factors or health measures require zoning controls, they must involve
safety and health characteristics which relate to the land under the
regulation."'" If housing needs require zoning amendments, therefore,
it will be important to relate those needs to the specific zoning change.
The more pronounced the relationship is between the zoning change
and the housing market, the greater the chances are of supporting the
amendment on these grounds.
An amendment may be contested on the basis that the change was
made when grounds existed for a variance and not an amendment.'"
This problem usually arises when a landowner greatly benefits from a
recent zoning amendment. Again, in this situation, it is crucial to re-
late the zoning change to the overall welfare of the community either
by showing how the housing shortage will be alleviated by the amend-
ment or how changes in land use indicate the new use will be more
beneficial for the community at large.
125 Greenberg v. City of New Rochelle, 206 Misc. 28, 32, 129 N.Y.S.2d 691, 695
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
124 Lamarre v. Commissioner of Pub. Works, 324 Mass. 542, 547, 87 N.E.2d 211,
214 (1949); People ex rd. Miller v. Gill, 389 III. 394, 403, 59 N.E.2d 671, 674 (1945);
Greenberg v. Town of New Rochelle, 206 Misc. 28, 34, 129 N.Y.S.2d 691, 696 (Sup. Ct.
1954); Malafronte v. Planning & Zoning Bd., 155 Conn. 205, 210, 230 A.2d 606, 609
(1967). In Malafrante, the court stated: -
The purpose of zoning is to serve the interest of the community as a whole,
and one of those interests is to provide adequate housing. A change of zone
predicated on such an interest, if otherwise consistent with the accepted prin-
ciples of zoning, is a reasonable exercise of the board's discretionary powers.
Id. at 212, 230 A.2d at 610.
125 24 App. Div.2d 165, 265 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1965).
1-20 Id. at 171, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 246.
127 Borough of Cresskill'v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 251, 104 A.2d 441, 448
(1954); see also People ex rd. Miller v. Gill, 389 Ill. 394, 400, 59 N.E.2d 671, 673 (1945).
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C. Creation of New Zoning Districts
Both the variance and the amendment process may result in the
haphazard placement of apartments inconveniently located in relation
to shopping centers, public transportation and schools."' To remedy
this situation and to provide more adequate planning, communities
have adopted zoning ordinances which provide for apartment con-
struction "by right" within certain districts."' These districts might
be multiple-use districts, or special districts which permit apartments
and related convenience commercial establishments, for example, shop-
ping centers or apartments with office buildings in a single architec-
tural unit.'" By providing for a multi-family use by right, specific
restrictions and regulations can be stipulated beforehand in the zoning
ordinance to provide for adequate parking space, play area, landscap-
ing, noise and light abatement, traffic controls and density require-
ments. These restrictions tend to appease the local landowners and
placate their fears about multi-family units. Some communities pro-
vide a "permissive use" for multi-family dwellings. This use requires
legislative permission before it can be implemented and, consequently,
adequate safeguards can be provided beforehand when establishing
the restrictions on permissive uses. It also forewarns property owners
of the possible uses they may encounter in each district. A legislature
can limit the number of multi-family dwellings with this type of zoning
technique, and can maintain a proper balance between municipal ser-
vices and the number of families in the community.
A recent attempt by a town in Massachusetts to provide in its by-
laws, by amendment, an additional use for public housing in all the
existing use districts, except industrial, was attacked on the grounds
that it was discriminating against private multi-family housing which
had only a permissive use in all the districts except industrial."' In
other words, a private developer would have to obtain legislative
approval before he could erect a complex, whereas public housing could
be built as a matter of right. In upholding the amendment, the court
said that the zoning by-law applied uniformly to all public housing,
thereby meeting the charge of non-uniformity, and then went on to
say that public housing is sufficiently different so as to be placed in a
separate category for zoning purposes."' The court side-stepped the
spot zoning issue and condoned the multiple-use district created by
the amendment allowing public housing in the residential and agricul-
tural districts. Evidently, the court felt that the town was acting
reasonably and with the public interest in mind in providing this
advantage to public housing. In light of this development, and the
128 Siegel, Relation of Planning and Zoning to Housing Policy and Law, 20 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 419, 422 (1955).
120 Grossman, supra note 114, at 5,
180 Id.
181 Cameron v. Zoning Agent, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1081, 260 N.E.2d 143 (1970).
182 Id, at 1085, 260 N.E.2d at 146.
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attempt by subsidized private developers to provide more low and
moderate-income multi-family dwellings, it might be possible for sub-
sidized housing to be treated separately because of its semi-public
nature and function. If this were allowed, then suburban communities
could make special provisions in their zoning ordinances, either by
amendment or addition, to make it financially feasible and procedur-
ally less cumbersome for subsidized housing to be built in heretofore
exclusionary communities. Separate treatment for zoning purposes of
subsidized housing would allow the local community to provide, yet
adequately control, housing for low and moderate-income families
without fearing a boom of other apartments.
D. The Floating Zone
Some communities that are completely zoned and do not have
adequate provisions for multi-family dwellings may adopt a zone which
has specified uses and restrictions yet does not have any specified
boundaries until it is located by an interested party who can satisfy
the minimum requisites of qualification for use. This type of zone has
become known as a "floating zone." Since its boundaries are not speci-
fied on a zoning map until an interested party obtains a rezoning of
his property, and since it generally disregards the principle of segre-
gation of uses, it is non-Euclidean in concept. The impetus behind the
use of this zone has been the amelioration of the detrimental effects
of discordant uses which were the basis of Euclidean zoning. Since
World War II, with the rush into the suburban towns, light industries,
which can operate in a residential area without creating excessive
noise, smoke or odor, have been lured by these suburbs in order to
reduce the tax burden on property owners.'" Apartments and shopping
malls are essential for suburbs seeking to retain light industries, and
they have become both architecturally and aesthetically less obtrusive.
Consequently, some communities have been willing to use the floating
zone concept for these uses, rather than completely rezone the com-
munity which might meet strenuous opposition from existing residen-
tial property owners. The floating zone technique, because it must be
adopted by the local legislature, will be in accordance with the com-
prehensive plan if the requirement for the comprehensive plan in that
state is that the legislature carefully consider and adopt a reasonable
zoning change. However, since this technique allows the developer or
industry to choose the most advantageous location rather than having
a municipality rezone an area for a specified use and later find that
industry or developers are not interested in that location, it can be
argued that there is no comprehensive plan, or even if there is one, it
is being carried on by a private party. The latter argument is the basic
objection to this type of zoning.
183 Reno, Non-Euclidean Zoning: The Use of the Floating Zone, 23 Maryland L.
Rev. 105, 106 (1963).
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Some statest" specifically prohibit floating zones in their zoning
enabling act; where there is no express prohibition, the courts have
reached different conclusions as to the validity of the floating zone con-
cept. Pennsylvania has determined that the use of a floating zone is
not within the power of municipalities under the Pennsylvania State
Zoning Enabling Act.'" In contrast, in Rodgers v. Village of Tarry-
town,'" the New York court held that since the local legislature could
have amended the zoning ordinance to allow multi-family dwellings in
residential zones as a matter of right, then it was authorized to accom-
plish the same effect by the use of floating zones. The court bolstered
its finding by stressing the changed conditions that brought this tech-
nique into operation, and the fact that the local legislature ratified
the zoning change when it amended the zoning map. The village plan-
ning board had authority to approve the amendment upon application
from an interested party and, if its approval was not forthcoming, then
the board of trustees of the village could grant the amendment. If the
zone is considered to "exist" upon the original enactment creating the
zones, then the planning board, by giving its approval, is actually
fixing the location of the zone, and its action is subject to attack as an
unauthorized delegation of authority. If, however, the zone does not
come into "existence" until the zoning map is amended, then, since the
legislature's approval is necessary for this amendment, it is more diffi-
cult to find an abuse of authority. The requirement for any zoning
change to be in accordance with the comprehensive plan is met by the
fact that the legislature determined the need for this type of zoning
device and put any necessary limitations on it when it was enacted.
However, if zoning is viewed as a more positive technique which re-
quires continual attention to ensure compliance with the comprehen-
sive plan, then the legislature's abdication of drawing zoning boun-
daries is not a valid approach and should be invalidated. The question
remains, however, whether it can even be called a plan for community
zoning when private interests determine the location of zoning boun-
daries.'" The court in Rodgers dismissed the objection that adjacent
landowners would not have adequate notice of a zoning change since
all areas were potential sites for the floating zone by stating that no
more warning would be given if multi-family dwelling use was a per-
mitted use in residential districts, this method of zoning being clearly
within the authority of the legislature.
184 See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, the Mass. Zoning Enabling Act. Section 6
provides:
No provision of a zoning ordinance or by-law shall be valid which sets apart
zoning districts or zones by establishing between them a boundary line which
may subsequently be changed without the adoption of an amendment to a
zoning ordinance or by-law so changing such line.
185 Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960).
185 302 N.Y. 115, 122, 96 N.E.2d 731, 734 (1951),
187 See Reno, supra note 133, at 116.
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The floating zone has great potential for multi-family unit con-
struction particularly now that apartments have become both physi-
cally more attractive and economically essential for suburban com-
munities attempting to house employees of light industries residing in
their community. The procedural framework of the floating zone pro-
cess will be the crucial factor in determining its validity. A recent at-
tempt in Massachusetts'" to allow the zoning board of appeals to issue
a permit for the construction of apartments anywhere in the commu-
nity was struck down as an improper delegation of power to the board
of appeals.'" If the by-law that was changed in this case had provided
that an amendment be made to bring about a zoning change in com-
pliance with the permit granted by the board of appeals, it could be
argued that this was a proper delegation of authority since the permit
was not effective until the legislature ratified the zoning change. This
Massachusetts town, however, was apparently attempting to grant a
permit for apartment construction without any change in zoning classi-
fication. This technique was an attempt to skirt the delegation of
zoning authority and spot zoning issues by retaining the original zon-
ing classification. Since the court felt the effective result was the same
as spot zoning, it invalidated the procedure, not because zoning was
established in contradiction to the comprehensive plan, but because
the "zoning" was done by an unauthorized board. If the court had
been willing to accept a permitted use within a district essentially
different in nature from the primary use, as the court did in Cameron
v. Zoning Agent,'" another Massachusetts case, then it might have
been possible to argue that this procedure did not result, even con-
structively, in spot zoning. This is particularly evident in light of the
many multiple-use districts presently considered valid. If the court
concludes that rezoning did not take place, then there is no further
objection to an administrative board issuing permits. The floating
zone, then, while it in some respects has the disadvantages of both
the variance and the amendment, does allow for greater flexibility in
the planning of apartment location..
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether suburban zoning ordinances are adapted to provide for
multi-family units by an amendment or a variance to the zoning
ordinance or by a basic change in the ordinance to create floating
zones or multiple-use districts, the result is a movement away from
the segregation of uses concept of Euclidean zoning and its inherent
limitations for flexibility and change. Once the breach is sufficiently
widened, it will be necessary to formulate new standards for zoning
validity since all present standards are derived from Euclidean as-
sumptions about land use and planning.
188 Senkarik v. Attorney Gen., 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 457, 257 N.E.2d 470 (1970).
139 Id. at 458, 257 N.E.2d at 472; See also Smith v. Board of Appeals, 319 Mass.
341, 65 N.E.2d 547 (1946).
140 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1081, 260 N.E.2d 143, 144 (1970).
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Zoning is "by no means static."' With the expansion of business
into the suburbs and the need for multi-family dwellings, especially low
and moderate-income housing, it is important to re-examine these basic
assumptions upon which zoning law developed, and retest their ap-
plicability and validity today. As more pressure is exerted by state
and federal governments on local communities to bear more of the
burdens of the housing shortage, zoning concepts will be tested under
new notions of community welfare to include regional welfare"' and
the right of each person to adequate housing."' To alleviate the hous-
ing shortage, some groups have recommended the preemption of local
zoning.'" This should cause communities to seek more flexible zon-
ing techniques to ensure both more multi-family dwellings and also
adequate safeguards for the existing landowner and resident.
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